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I. PROLOGUE
When you came into your law office a week ago this morning, your
secretary reminded you of Howard Staunton's appointment for 2:00 p.m. to
discuss a new will. You began reviewing your previous work for Colonel
Staunton, a valued client whom it has always been a pleasure to serve. First
came the 1940 will, prepared when Howard received orders to extended
active duty as a National Guard captain. His son John was three years old
then, his net worth was inconsiderable, and the will gave everything to his
wife Mary. Twenty years later came the 1960 will, made after Howard had
become a millionaire, with A and B trusts to take advantage of the maxi-
mum marital deduction. In 1970, after Mary's death, Howard asked you to
do two things. First, to organize a charitable corporation to which he could
convey the old Philidor mansion at 2 Carlisle Crescent and give part of his
world-famous collection of chess sets, thus establishing the Staunton Mu-
seum of Chess. This was easy. His second request was not. He wanted to
establish a perpetual fund to promote chess tournaments. You worried a lot
about that request and you still wonder how long the device you used will
* Note for readers who do not have the Oxford English Dictionagy handy:
"Orts" are left-overs; what a person with powers of disposition and consumption
does not dispose of or consume.
t Copyright © 1983, William F. Fratcher.
** R.B. Price Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Missouri-
Columbia.
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work.' In 1973, Howard told you of his impending marriage to Helen Han-
cock and of their agreement, made in view of the fact that she is beneficiary
of a large marital deduction trust set up by her second husband, George
Hancock, that neither should have marital rights in the other's property.
You then drew up the antenuptial settlement and prepared a will for How-
ard leaving only a nominal amount to Helen.
II. CONUNDRUM
Howard Staunton bustled in at 2:00 p.m. on the minute, looking
remarkably fit for a man in his seventies. He said, "Helen has been a won-
derful companion and we have been very happy together. She shares my
enthusiasm for chess and collecting chess sets. I suspect that she knows
more about both than I do. She and her children by Henry West and
George Hancock don't need or seek any of my money, but I want to be sure
that she can enjoy, as fully as I do, the house where we live next to the
museum and the furnishings and chess sets in it. I want you to prepare a
will which will make Helen the absolute owner of the house and everything
in it, with power to sell anything she likes and spend the proceeds as she
pleases and to give away whatever she likes. But what she doesn't sell or
give away is to go to the museum corporation. With the two adjacent
houses on Carlisle Crescent and the chess sets I have collected since my 1970
gift to the museum, the Staunton Museum of Chess would be unbeatable."
You then told Howard Staunton that, although his wishes are much
like those of many testators and are not illegal, immoral, or contrary to
public policy, the courts will thwart them if they are expressed frankly and
clearly in his will. The best that can be done, you said, is to approximate
his wishes by indirect or devious means. You suggested that he return in a
week and discuss with you a list of possible methods of carrying out his
wishes to the extent that the courts permit. Since then you have been mak-
ing up a tentative list and checking the authorities bearing on each method.
III. METHODS THE COURTS WILL THWART
A. Shifting Executory Devise on Failure to Alienate Inter Vivos
This is what Howard Staunton asked you to do, expressed in legal
terms. The clause of the will would run something like this: "I devise my
home at 4 Carlisle Crescent to my beloved wife, Helen Anderson Staunton,
and her heirs, and I bequeath the contents thereof, including my collection
of chess sets, to my said wife, absolutely and forever, but if my said wife
does not convey the house to another during her lifetime or does not sell or
give away any of the contents, the property retained by her shall pass at her
1. See Daley v. Lloyds Bank, Ltd., 61 T.L.R. 50, 51 (Ch. 1944); Fratcher, Be-
quests for Purposes, 56 IowA L. REv. 773, 776 (1971).
[Vol. 48
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death to the Staunton Museum of Chess, a charitable corporation, its suc-
cessors and assigns."
This clause would give Helen an estate in fee simple in the home, sub-
ject to a shifting executory devise to the museum to take effect if she does
not convey the home by deed. Such a shifting executory devise would not
violate the Rule Against Perpetuities and would be valid in England if
Howard Staunton held the home by copyhold tenure.' But copyhold ten-
ure was abolished in England in 1926' and has never existed in your state,
so Howard is not a copyholder; he is necessarily a freeholder. The Statute
of Wills,4 which did not apply to copyhold,5 empowered every freehold ten-
ant in fee simple to devise his estate by will. There are, of course, statutes to
the same effect in every state. With such legislation in force, it is under-
standable that the courts have taken the position that a tenant in fee simple
cannot be deprived of power to devise her land by will; that is, if Helen left
a will devising the house, her devisee would take.6 It does not necessarily
follow logically that, if Helen did not attempt to devise the home by will,
the shifting executory devise to the museum would fail. Nevertheless, most
courts have held that the shifting executory devise to the museum is void
whether or not Helen makes a will devising the home, and they reach the
same result as to the chattels in the house.7 It will not do to run afoul of the
rule against restraints on testamentary alienation, so this formula should
2. See Doe ex dem. Stevenson v. Glover, 1 C.B. 448, 135 Eng. Rep. 615 (C.P.
1843). Copyhold, the later name of the medieval villein tenure, could be conveyed
inter vivos only by surrender to the lord of the manor and regrant by him and could
be devised by will only if the copyholder surrendered to the lord of the manor to
such uses as he should by will appoint. I C. WATKINS, TREATISE ON COPYHOLDS
42-43, 50-51, 102, 121 (1797). As the Statute of Uses, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 10, did
not apply to copyhold, it was doubtful whether a shifting use could be created, but
a shifting executory devise was possible. 1 C. WATKINS, sUpra, at 198-202. As Steven-
son held, there was no objection to a devise of copyhold in fee simple subject to a
shifting executory devise on failure to alienate inter vivos. The taker of the shifting
executory interest was successful in ejecting a daughter of the original devisee, to
whom the latter had tried to devise the land by will.
3. Copyhold was converted into free and common socage, a freehold tenure,
by the Law of Property Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, ch. 16, effective January 1, 1926.
4. 32 Hen. 8, ch. 1, § 2 (1540).
5. 1 C. WATKINS, supra note 2, at 122.
6. Good v. Fichthorn, 144 Pa. 287, 291 (1891). See Holmes v. Godson, 8 De
G., M. & G. 152, 166, 44 Eng. Rep. 347, 353 (Lords Justices of Appeal 1856); W.
FRATCHER, PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 67-68 (1954); J. GRAY, RE-
STRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY §§ 56, 56b, 56c (2d ed. 1895);
Schnebly, Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property, in 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY § 26.41, at 473-474 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
7. Newland v. Newland, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) 463, 467 (1854); J. GRAY, supra
note 6, §§ 55, 56, 56a, 56b, 56c; L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAw OF FUTURE IN-
TERESTS § 1486 (2d ed. 1956).
1983]
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not be used even though it is the only one which expresses Howard
Staunton's wishes fully and accurately.
B. Shifting Executory Devise on Failure to Alienate Inter Vivos or by Will
This is not exactly what Howard Staunton asked you to do, but it is
close. The clause of the will would read, "I devise my home at 4 Carlisle
Crescent to my beloved wife, Helen Anderson Staunton, and her heirs, and
I bequeath the contents thereof, including my collection of chess sets, to my
said wife, absolutely and forever, but if my said wife does not convey or
devise the home or does not sell, give away, or bequeath any of the contents,
the property retained by her shall pass at her death to the Staunton Mu-
seum of Chess, a charitable corporation, its successors and assigns."
Before 1225 it seems to have been thought that a transfer of land to a
person "and his heirs" conveyed some sort of future interest to the heirs and
that, therefore, the tenant could not convey the full fee simple without the
joinder or consent of his prospective heir.' Then the courts held that the
heir could be cut off by an inter vivos conveyance to which he did not
consent.9 This meant that, if the heir ever took, he took by descent and not
by purchase. The 1540 Statute of Wills 0 permitted a freehold tenant in fee
simple to cut off his heir by will. But if a tenant in fee simple did not cut off
his heir by inter vivos conveyance or by will, the heir was entitled to inherit
the fee simple on the tenant's death. 1 This right of inheritance of estates in
fee simple on the death of the owner intestate is established by statute in
every state. If the formula suggested in the preceding paragraph is effec-
tive, it would create an estate in fee simple which, while alienable inter
vivos and by will, would be non-heritable. The English courts held that a
non-heritable freehold estate in fee simple cannot be created; the shifting
executory devise to the museum corporation is therefore void as an unlaw-
ful restraint on intestate descent. 2 As Mr. Justice Burnett put it in 1746,
"[A] devise in fee, upon the condition that his heirs shall not take by de-
8. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE
THE TIME OF EDWARD I at 307-09 (2d ed. 1923); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 73-75 (5th ed. 1942).
9. Fitz Roger v. Arundel, Bract. N.B. pl. 1054 (1225).
10. 32 Hen. 8, ch. 1, § 2.
11. Coronation Charter of Henry I § 2 (1100), reprinedin G. ADAMS & H. STE-
PHENS, SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 5 (192 1); 1 J.
BAGLEY & P. ROWLY, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 43 (1966); R.
GLANVILL, TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND
XIII at 150 (G. Hall ed. 1965) (lst ed. 1189); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at
275, 652 (7th ed. 1956); 3 id. at 171-85 (5th ed. 1942); 1 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, supra note 8, at 126-27.
12. See Gulliverexdm. Dell v. Vaux, 8 De G., M. & G. 167, 172. 44 Eng. Rep.
353, 356 (Nisi Prius 1746). But see Beachcroft v. Broome, 4 T.R. 441, 442 '00 Eng.
Rep. 1108, 1109 (K.B. 1791) (dictum of Lord Kenyon, C.J.).
[Vol. 48
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scent, unless he specially appoint them, is a void condition."' 3
An earlier case involved a will that devised and bequeathed
all my real and personal estate unto my son Francis Hall, and to
the heirs of his body .... and if my said son Francis Hall shall die,
leaving no heirs of his body living, then I give and bequeath so
much of my said real and personal estate, as my said son shall be
possessed of at his death, to the Goldsmiths Company [upon trust
for charity]. 4
Francis Hall suffered a common recovery of the land, executed a will ap-
pointing his wife executrix, and died without issue. It was held that, as to
the land, Francis took an estate tail with a remainder to the Goldsmiths
Company and that the common recovery converted the estate tail into an
estate in fee simple and destroyed the remainder. As to the personal prop-
erty, the court
was unanimous, that the limitation over was void, as the absolute
ownership had been given to F. H. for it is to him and the heirs of
his body, and the company are to have no more than he shall have
left unspent; and therefore he had a power to dispose of the whole;
which power was not expressly given to him, but it resulted from
his interest. 5
Later English decisions reach the same result. If a will is construed to devise
a freehold estate in fee simple in land or the general ownership of chattels,
an executory devise to another of what the original devisee does not dispose
of inter vivos or by will is void. 6
Most of the American decisions follow those in England. As Professor
Simes put it, "If a fee simple in land or a like interest in personalty is given,
coupled with an absolute power of disposal by deed or will, the great weight
13. Gulliverexdem. Dell v. Vaux, 8 DeG., M. &G. 167, 172,44Eng. Rep. 353,
356 (Nisi Prius 1746).
14. Attorney General ex rel. Goldsmiths Company v. Hall, Fitz-G. 314, 314, 94
Eng. Rep. 772, 772 (Ch. 1731).
15. Id. at 321, 94 Eng. Rep. at 775 (decision of Lord King, C.; Sir Joseph
Jekyll, M.R.; Reynolds, C.B.). Professors Gray and Simes thought that this case
should not be deemed authoritative in the United States because the decision was
based on an unsound and outmoded theory as to the nature of future interests in
chattels personal. See J. GRAY, supra note 6, § 68; L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note
7, § 1484. See also Simes, Future Interests in Chattels Personal, 39 YALE L.J. 771 (1930).
16. Lightburne v. Gill, 3 Brown 250, 1 Eng. Rep. 1300 (H.L. 1764) (investment
securities); Holmes v. Godson, 8 De G., M. & G. 152, 44 Eng. Rep. 347 (Lords
Justices of Appeal 1856) (devise of land in fee simple with shifting executory devise
on death intestate); Cuthbert v. Purrier, Jacob 415, 37 Eng. Rep. 907 (M.R. 1822)
(gift over of personalty on death of bastard son intestate void); Ross v. Ross, 1 Jac.
& W. 154, 37 Eng. Rep. 334 (M.R. 1819) (bequest to bastard son with shifting
executory interest to testator's daughter if son died without will; executory interest
held void, so money passed to the Crown as bona vacantia). Other English cases are
collected and discussed in J. GRAy, supra note 6, §§ 57-64; L. SIMES & A. SMITH,
supra note 7, § 1483; Ottway, Absolute Gi or Life Interest?, 109 L.J. 51 (1959).
1983]
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of authority is to the effect that a gift over in the same instrument of what
remains undisposed of is void."' 7 Some of the American cases proceed on
the theory that, because executory interests are not destructible by the ten-
ant in possession,1 8 the gift over cannot be an executory devise. A future
interest which cuts off an estate in fee simple cannot be a remainder because
remainders must follow estates tail or for life. The law knows no future
interests created in persons other than the transferor except remainders and
executory interests. Therefore, goes the argument, the gift over is void be-
cause it is neither a remainder nor an executory interest."
The majority rule, sometimes known as the Rule Against Restraints on
Intestate Succession, has been severely criticized,2 ° and it was rejected in a
1980 draft revision of the Restatement of Property.2 The rule has been
rejected or abrogated by statute in Alabama,2 2 Mississippi,2 3 Nebraska, 4
17. L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 7, § 1482, at 355. Numerous American
cases are collected in this section and in J. GRAY, supra note 6, §§ 65-74g. See also
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 406 comment g, illustrations 8-10 (1944); A.
KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS AND RESTRAINTS
IN ILLINOIS §§ 717-725 (1920); 5 H. TIFFANY, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY § 1344 (3d
ed. 1939); Eckhardt, Properoy-Future Interests Following Powers of Disposal in First
Taker, 16 Mo. L. REV. 388 (195 1); Hudson, Executog Limitations of Property in Mis-
souri, 11 U. Mo. BULL. L. SER. 3, 37-51 (1916); Nelson, Restraints on Alienation in
Missouri, 39 U. Mo. BULL. L. SER. 23, 33-34 (1928); Schnebly, supra note 6,
§§ 26.36-.46; Swenson, The Iowa Repugnancy Rule in Testamentay Dispositions, 41 IoWA
L. REV. 601 (1956); White, Life Estate or Fee?, 1 U. CIN. L. REV. 405 (1927); Youngs,
A Compendium of Cases on Future Interests in Kentucky, 6 N. KY. L. REV. 51, 73-83
(1979); Comment, The Effect of the Extent of a Power in the Owner of a Prior Estate Upon
the Validity of a Future Interest, 35 ILL. L. REV. 957 (1941); Note, Estate Including an
Absolute Power of Disposition, 6 NOTRE DAME LAw. 503 (1931); Note, Enlargement of
Life Estates to Fees Simple by the Annexation of a Power, 18 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 243
(1933); Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 7 (1951).
18. See Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620); N. PIGOrr,
TREATISE OF COMMON RECOVERIES, THEIR NATURE AND USE 127, 134 (2d ed.
1770).
19. Jackson ex dem. Livingston v. Robins, 16 Johns. 537, 589 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1819); Jackson ex dem. Brewster v. Bull, 10 Johns. 19, 21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813); 4 J.
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw *270.
20. See W. LEACH, PROPERTY LAW INDICTED 24-31 (1967). Professor Leach
discusses Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 76 A.2d 877 (1950), which involved a bequest of a
bank account to the husband of the testatrix with a gift over of any money in the
account at the husband's death to a niece. The majority of the court held the gift
over void. Id. at 13, 76 A.2d at 877. Professor Leach praised the dissenting opinion
of Chief Justice Vanderbilt, who sought to overrule the cases adopting the Rule
Against Restraints on Intestate Succession. W. LEACH, supra, at 27. See also
Schnebly, supra note 6, §§ 26.43, .44.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 4.2 comment 0, illustration 22
& Reporter's Note 12c (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1980).
22. ALA. CODE § 35-4-292 (1975); Nevin v. Nevin, 366 So. 2d 266 (Ala. 1979);
[Vol. 48
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New Jersey,25 New York,26 Ohio,27 Texas,28 West Virginia,29 and Wiscon-
sin.3" If Carlisle Crescent is in one of these nine states, the shifting execu-
tory devise to the museum may be valid. But even in these nine states there
may be reluctance to enforce the gift over.3 1 Method B had best be
rejected.
C. Semi-Secret Trust
If you are unwise enough to use this unsatisfactory device to try to
achieve your client's ends, the clause of the will would provide, "I devise my
home at 4 Carlisle Crescent to my beloved wife, Helen Anderson Staunton,
and her heirs, and I bequeath the contents thereof, including my collection
of chess sets, to my said wife, her executors, administrators, and assigns,
upon trust, however, as to both the real and personal property, for purposes
which she understands." When the will is executed, Helen will hand the
testator a letter reading something like this:
April 4, 1983
To Colonel Howard Staunton
My dearest husband:
I acknowledge that the home in which we reside and its con-
tents, including your collection of chess sets, which you have de-
vised and bequeathed to me by your will executed today, are to be
Bradley v. Eskridge, 361 So. 2d 100 (Ala. 1978); Brashier v. Burkett, 350 So. 2d 309
(Ala. 1977); Bailey v. Brannon, 293 Ala. 83, 300 So. 2d 344 (1974). Cf. Hendrix v.
Hester, 385 So. 2d 990 (Ala. 1980).
23. Rose v. Bennett, 193 Miss. 878, 11 So. 2d 307 (1943) (money); Selig v.
Trost, 110 Miss. 584, 70 So. 699 (1916) (land and chattels).
24. In re Darr's Estate, 114 Neb. 116, 206 N.W. 2 (1925) (land and chattels).
But see Sterner v. Nelson, 210 Neb. 358, 314 N.W.2d 263 (1982) (indicating a return
to the majority rule).
25. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-16 (West 1953) (will of testator dying after January
1, 1952). See Greene v. Schmurak, 39 N.J. Super. 392, 121 A.2d 35 (1956).
26. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 6-5.10 (McKinney 1967); In re Ben-
nett's Will, 275 N.Y. 593, 11 N.E.2d 770 (1937) (land and chattels); Tillman v.
Ogren, 227 N.Y. 495, 125 N.E. 821 (1920) (land and money). But see In re Estate of
Long, 60 Misc. 2d 591, 303 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sur. Ct. 1969). See also Glasser, Practice
Commentag, N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 6-5.10 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
27. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.07 (Page 1976); In re Knickel's Will, 185
N.E.2d 93 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1961).
28. Jones v. Walter, 436 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. 1968); McMurray v. Stanley, 69
Tex. 227, 6 S.W. 412 (1887) (land and chattels); Johnson v. Stark, 585 S.W.2d 900
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979); First National Bank of Corsicana v. De Foe, 384 S.W.2d 926
(Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
29. W. VA. CODE § 36-1-16 (1966); In re Estate of Evans, 156 W. Va. 425, 194
S.E.2d 379 (1973); Simonton, Estates-Effect of Power in Life Tenant to Make Absolute
Disposition of Propert--overning Statute, 37 W. VA. L.Q. 422 (1931).
30. In re Zweifel's Will, 194 Wis. 428, 216 N.W. 840 (1927) (land and chattels).
31. See, e.g., Tillman v. Ogren, 227 N.Y. 495, 504, 125 N.E. 821, 823-24 (1920).
1983]
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held by me on trust, to the extent that I own any of the property
at the time of my death, for the Staunton Museum of Chess, a
charitable corporation, its successors and assigns.
Your loving wife,
Helen A. Staunton
There is authority in England and six American states for the validity
of the beneficial interest of the museum,3 2 but even in one of these jurisdic-
tions Helen will not have the freedom to sell or give away the property
which Howard wants her to have because the fact that she holds on trust
will be of record and her powers as trustee will not be. In the other Ameri-
can states, the beneficial interests of both Helen and the museum will fail
and she will hold the house and its contents on resulting trust for the residu-
ary devisees and legatees or the heirs and next of kin of the testator.
33
Under Methods A and B, Helen's title would be good even if the shifting
executory devise to the museum was bad. Under Method C, neither Helen
nor the museum would get anything. Method C should be rejected out of
hand.
IV. METHODS WHICH MAY SUCCEED
D. Secret Trust
If this device is used, the clause of the will would provide, "I devise my
home at 4 Carlisle Crescent to my beloved wife, Helen Anderson Staunton,
and her heirs, and I bequeath the contents thereof, including my collection
of chess sets, to my said wife, her executors, administrators, and assigns."
When the will is executed, Helen will hand the testator a letter like this:
April 4, 1983
To Colonel Howard Staunton
My dearest husband:
You have executed a will today devising and bequeathing to
me the home in which we reside and its contents, including your
collection of chess sets. It is our understanding that I am free to
convey the house in fee simple absolute and sell or give away any
of the contents and that I may use any proceeds of sale of either as
I wish. It is also understood between us that whatever part of this
property I own at the time of my death shall be held on trust for
32. See, e.g., Curdy v. Berton, 79 Cal. 420, 21 P. 858 (1889); Cagney v. O'Brien,
83 Ill. 72 (1876); Hughes v. Bent, 118 Ky. 609, 81 S.W. 931 (1904); Linney v. Cleve-
land Trust Co., 30 Ohio App. 345, 165 N.E. 101 (1928); Hartman's Estate (No. 2),
320 Pa. 331, 182 A. 232 (1936); Blackwell v. Blackwell, 1929 A.C. 318. There are
New York decisions for and against the validity of the museum's interest. See, e.g.,
Jay v. Lee, 41 Misc. 13, 83 N.Y.S. 579 (1903) (for); Trunkey v. Van Sant, 176 N.Y.
535, 68 N.E. 946 (1903) (against). Other cases are collected in 1 A. ScoTT, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS § 55.8 (3d ed. 1967). See Matthews, The True Basis of the Haf-Secret
Trst?, 1979 CoNY. 360; Annot., 67 A.L.R. 349 (1930).
33. Olliffe v. Wells, 130 Mass. 221, 226 (1881). Other cases are collected in 1 A.
ScoTT, supra note 32, § 55.8.
[ l. 48
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Helen's letter cannot create a trust when it is signed because there is no
trust property owned by her at that time.34 There is a question as to
whether a trust will arise on Howard's death, because it will still be un-
known what Helen will own at the time of her death.3 5 In any event, the
will and Helen's letter cannot create an express testamentary trust, because
to create such a trust, the intent to create a trust must be expressed in the
will and it must be possible to ascertain from the language of the will the
identity of the beneficiary, the trust property, and the purposes of the
trust.36 However, when a testator makes a will or refrains from changing it
in reliance upon the promise of a devisee or legatee to hold the property
devised or bequeathed upon trust for another, the English courts and most
American courts will impose a constructive trust upon the devisee or legatee
without proof of fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake, or confidential
relationship.3 7 There are, however, cases in eight states suggesting that a
constructive trust will not be imposed without proof of fraud or a confiden-
tial relationship.
38
It would be well to check the decisions in your state before adopting
this method of carrying out Howard Staunton's wishes. If it does work, it
will achieve almost exactly what he wants. Helen will be, for all practical
purposes, the absolute owner of the house and its contents as long as she
lives. Yet the museum, if it has her letter, will be protected against her
executor, devisees, legatees, heirs, and next of kin.
34. In re Ellenborough, [1903] 1 Ch. 697, 701; 1 A. ScoTr, supra note 32, § 86.1.
35. Edwards v. Edwards, 1 Wash. App. 67, 459 P.2d 422 (1969); 1 A. ScoTr,
supra note 32, § 76.
36. 1 A. ScoTr, supra note 32, §§ 54, 55.
37. De Laurencel v. De Boom, 48 Cal. 581, 585 (1874) (devise of land);
Drakeford v. Wilks, 3 Atk. 539, 541, 26 Eng. Rep. 1111, 1112 (Ch. 1747) (bequest of
bond; promise by legatee to give it to plaintiff upon legatee's death); Oldham v.
Litchfield, 2 Vern. 506, 506, 23 Eng. Rep. 923, 924 (Ch. 1705) (devise of land). See
also Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24, 39 (1869); Jones v. McKee, 3 Pa. 496, 500
(1846). Other cases, including those requiring proof of fraud or a confidential rela-
tionship, are collected in 1 A. Scor, supra note 32, § 55.1; Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 808
(1950); Annot., 155 A.L.R. 106 (1945); Annot., 66 A.L.R. 156 (1930).
38. See, e.g., Moore v. Campbell, 102 Ala. 445, 453, 14 So. 780, 782-83 (1893);
Henrichs v. Sundmaker, 405 Ill. 62, 65, 89 N.E.2d 732, 734 (1950); Vance v. Grow,
206 Ind. 614, 625, 190 N.E. 747, 751 (1934); Hermann v. Hermann, 193 Iowa 1201,
1204, 188 N.W. 806, 808 (1922); Yeager v. Yeager, 155 Kan. 734, 735, 129 P.2d 242,
243 (1942); Haack v. Burmeister, 289 Mich. 418, 425, 286 N.W. 666, 669 (1939); In
re Weir's Estate, 134 Wash. 560, 567, 236 P. 285, 287 (1925).
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E. Contract to Make a Will
If this method is chosen, the will would contain the same clause as used
in Method D (secret trust), but Helen's letter will be slightly different. It
will read something like this:
April 4, 1983
To Colonel Howard Staunton
My dearest husband:
You have executed a will today devising and bequeathing to
me the home in which we reside and its contents, including your
collection of chess sets. As our antenuptial agreement deprives me
of marital rights in your property, you have no obligation to de-
vise and bequeath this property to me. It is our understanding
that I am free to convey the house in fee simple absolute and sell
or give away any of the contents and that I may use any proceeds
of sale of either as I wish.39 In consideration of your making this
will and keeping it in force until your death, I agree that I will
devise and bequeath by will whatever part of this property I own
at the time of my death to the Staunton Museum of Chess, a char-
itable corporation, its successors and assigns.
Your loving wife,
Helen A. Staunton
A written and signed contract to dispose of property by will, supported
by substantial consideration, is valid in England and all American states.
40
If the promisor fails to execute the agreed will or fails to keep it in force, the
person or corporation to whom the promisor agreed to devise the property
can, at least when the property is specific land or unique chattels, by a suit
in equity in the nature of a suit for specific performance of contract, compel
the persons who take title on the death of the promisor by will or intestate
succession to convey the property to him or it.4 1
39. It is important that this sentence be in the letter because courts sometimes
treat inter vivos transfers made by the promisor under a contract to make a will as
breaches of the contract. See, e.g., Skinner v. Rasche, 165 Ky. 108, 112, 176 S.W.
942, 944 (1915); Quinn v. Quinn, 5 S.D. 328, 334, 58 N.W. 808, 810 (1894); Swin-
gley v. Daniels, 123 Wash. 409, 416, 212 P. 729, 730 (1923). Cases on this point are
collected in Sparks, Legal Efe~ct of Contracts to Devise or Bequeath Prior to the Death of the
Promisor, 53 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1954).
40. Gould v. Mansfield, 103 Mass. 408 (1869); Anding v. Davis, 38 Miss. 574
(1860); Bynum v. Bynum, 33 N.C. 632 (1850); Rivers v. Rivers, 3 S.C. Eq. (I Des.)
190 (1811); Fenton v. Emblers, 3 Burr. 1278, 97 Eng. Rep. 831 (1762); Goilmere v.
Battison, 1 Vein. 48, 23 Eng. Rep. 301 (1682); T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF WILLS § 48 (1953); B. SPARKS, CONTRACrS TO MAKE WILLS 1-21 (1956);
Sparks, Historical Development of the Law of Contracts to Devise or Bequeath, 42 KY. LJ.
573, 583 (1954); Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 370 (1953); Annot., 106 A.L.R. 742 (1937);
Annot., 69 A.L.R. 14 (1930).
41. Crail v. Blakely, 8 Cal. 3d 744, 505 P.2d 1027, 106 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1973);
Redke v. Silvertrust, 6 Cal. 3d 94, 490 P.2d 805, 98 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1971); Matthews
v. Turner, 581 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979); Owens v. Savage, 518 S.W.2d
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You may decide, after checking local decisions, that this is the best
method of carrying out Howard Staunton's wishes. It will make Helen, so
far as anyone but the museum is concerned, the absolute owner of the prop-
erty and relieve her of the suggestion of fiduciary duty to the museum in-
herent in the trust device. If the museum has her letter, it will be able to get
all of the property passing to her under Howard's will which she owns at
the time of her death, whether or not she complies with the contract. In
England, this method would operate in a fashion which is virtually identi-
cal with the secret trust.4 2 If Helen does comply with the contract, there
will be no need to use her letter unless her will is contested.
F. Life Estate Plus Power of Appointment and Gift in Default
Like Methods A and B, which probably will not work, and unlike
Methods C, D, and E, Method F requires only one instrument, Howard
Staunton's will. The clause of the will would provide "I devise my home at
4 Carlisle Crescent and bequeath the contents thereof, including my collec-
tion of chess sets, to my beloved wife, Helen Anderson Staunton, for and
during the term of her natural life only, without impeachment of waste,
remainder to such persons as she may by deed, bill of sale, or inter vivos gift
appoint, remainder in default of appointment to the Staunton Museum of
Chess, a charitable corporation, its successors and assigns." If this method
works, it will give the museum a vested remainder, subject to total or partial
defeasance by the exercise of Helen's power of inter vivos alienation.
4 3
192 (Mo. App., K.C. 1974); T. ATKINSON, supra note 40, at 213. This is clearly true
if the person to whom the devise or bequest is to be made is a party to the contract.
See numerous cases collected in Sparks, Enforcement of Contracts to Devise or Bequeath
After the Death of the Promisor, 39 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1954); Sparks, supra note 40, at
146-61. When, as in the case of the Staunton Museum of Chess, the intended devi-
see of the property is a third party donee beneficiary, the availability of such relief
may be questionable in a jurisdiction in which a third party beneficiary is not enti-
tled to maintain an action at law for breach of contract. S. WILLISTON, A TREA-
TISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 119B, 348, 357-360, 368, 370, 1420 (3d ed.
1968). However, although a third party donee beneficiary may not maintain an
action at law for breach of contract in England, Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 B. & S. 393,
397-98, 121 Eng. Rep. 762, 764 (Q.B. 1861), a third party donee beneficiary of a
contract to devise or bequeath property by will may maintain a suit in equity to get
the property on a trust theory. In re Hagger, [1930] 2 Ch. 190, 195; In re Green,
1951 Ch. 148, 154-55. See Stone v. Hoskins, 1905 P. 194; Annot., 73 A.L.R. 1395
(1931); Annot., 66 A.L.R. 1439 (1930); Annot., 33 A.L.R. 739 (1924); Annot., 2
A.L.R. 1193 (1919).
42. See English cases cited note 41 supra.
43. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 86a, 112, 112a (3d ed.
1915); L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 7, §§ 150, 360. If the courts of your state
have indicated a leaning toward the Doctrine of Double Thwart, discussed infra, it
might be safer to have the clause of the will provide: "I devise my home at 4 Car-
lisle Crescent and bequeath the contents thereof, including my collection of chess
19831
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The chief danger in the use of this method is the Doctrine of Double
Thwart, which might also be called the Doctrine of Maximum Frustration
of Purpose. Courts are wont to say that the intention of the testator is the
pole star of testamentary construction."H This is as it should be, but too
often such a statement is followed by one like this: "Now with respect to
what Isaac intended by limiting Mary's interest in his estate to an estate for
life. . . . Isaac's will must be interpreted from the language used by him
and not according to what others might think he meant or what he might
have thought the words . . . meant . . . ."" We do not know what the
learned chief justice thought that his words meant or what others might
think he meant, but they suggest to us that the court which adopted them
was not much interested in carrying out Isaac's real intention, even though
it could ascertain it without difficulty. It is, perhaps, this kind of judicial
approach to will construction which leads to such results as the Doctrine of
Double Thwart.
The Doctrine of Double Thwart works like this. Thwart 1: If a life
tenant is given an unlimited power of disposition, this will be construed to
give him an estate in fee simple in land or the absolute ownership of chat-
tels, even though it is perfectly clear that the testator intended him to have
only an estate or interest for life. Thwart 2: Although the testator clearly
intended to have the life estate or interest followed immediately by a vested
remainder in a named person or corporation, it cannot be a remainder be-
cause there cannot be a remainder on the estate in fee simple which we
have foisted upon the life tenant in defiance of the testator's wishes.
4 6
Therefore, the intended remainder must be treated as an executory devise.
As the authorities cited in connection with Methods A and B proclaim, a
shifting executory devise or bequest to take effect upon the death of a free-
hold tenant in fee simple or an absolute owner of chattels if he fails to dis-
pose of the property is void as a restraint on testate or intestate succession.
Therefore, the remainder fails and the property passes under the life ten-
ant's will or to her intestate successors. Even though the testator's intent is
clear and, as has been illustrated by the rule that an identical shifting exec-
utory interest on a copyhold estate in fee simple is valid,4 7 there is no viola-
tion of public policy, the testator's intent will be double-thwarted because
sets, to my beloved wife, Helen Anderson Staunton, for a term of forty years if she
shall so long live, without impeachment of waste, remainder to such persons as she
may by deed, bill of sale, or inter vivos gift appoint, and subject to the said term
and power, to the Staunton Museum of Chess, a charitable corporation, its succes-
sors and assigns." By devising a present estate to the museum, subject to Helen's
term and power, you may reduce the danger of a court's holding that Helen takes a
fee simple.
44. See, e.g., In re Keefer's Estate, 353 Pa. 281, 283, 45 A.2d 31, 32 (1946).
45. McCain v. Womble, 265 N.C. 640, 644, 144 S.E.2d 857, 859-60 (1965).
46. See notes 17-19 and accompanying text supra.
47. See note 2 supra.
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devises and bequests of orts are not enforced with respect to land held in
free and common socage or with respect to chattels personal.
The Supreme Court of Michigan was notorious for its adherence to the
Doctrine of Double Thwart4" until a 1930 decision manifested reduced en-
thusiasm for that doctrine.4 9 Tennessee was another stronghold of the doc-
trine 0 until 1929, when the court criticized it,5 after which the legislature
abolished it.5 2 Virginia and West Virginia also applied the Doctrine of
Double Thwart with zeal5 3 until it was abolished by statute.54 The Virginia
courts have shown some tendency to forget or ignore the statute abolishing
the Doctrine of Double Thwart,5 5 and they will not apply it unless the
holder of the power is expressly limited to a life estate.56
In the other American states and in England, it is possible to have a
48. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 213 Mich. 31, 181 N.W. 41 (1921); White v.
Grand Rapids & Ind. Ry., 190 Mich. 1, 155 N.W. 719 (1915); Killefer v. Bassett,
146 Mich. 1, 109 N.W. 21 (1906); Moran v. Moran, 143 Mich. 322, 106 N.W. 206
(1906); Dills v. La Tour, 136 Mich. 243, 98 N.W. 1004 (1904); Jones v. Jones, 25
Mich. 401 (1872); W. FRATCHER, supra note 6, at 69-72.
49. Quarton v. Barton, 249 Mich. 474, 483, 229 N.W. 465, 467-68 (1930), noted
in 29 MICH. L. REv. 761 (1931).
50. See, e.g., Van Deventer v. McMullen, 157 Tenn. 571, 11 S.W.2d 867 (1928);
Davis v. Richardson, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 290 (1837).
51. Waller v. Sproles, 160 Tenn. 11, 19, 22 S.W.2d 4, 6 (1929).
52. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-106 (1982). See also Leach v. Dick, 205 Tenn.
221, 326 S.W.2d 438 (1959). But in Webb v. Webb, 53 Tenn. App. 609, 385 S.W.2d
295 (1964), a devise to the testator's widow "for the full period of her natural life,"
with unrestricted powers of disposition and consumption, was construed to give the
widow an estate in fee simple absolute in the absence of a remainder. Id. at 613-14,
385 S.W.2d at 297.
53. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hicks, 109 Va. 615, 64 S.E. 988 (1909); May v. Joynes,
62 Va. (20 Gratt.) 692 (1871); Morgan v. Morgan, 60 W. Va. 327, 55 S.E. 389
(1906); Cocke, The Rule of Construction in May v. Joynes, 14 VA. L. REG. 161 (1908);Simonton, Gij? of a Life Estate with Absolute Power of Disposal by Deed, 36 W. VA. L.
288 (1930).
54. VA. CODE § 55-7 (1981) (enacted in 1908, amended in 1919 and 1978); W.
VA. CODE 36-1-16 (1966). See also Potter v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 545 (N.D.
W. Va. 1967),notedin 70 W. VA. L. REv. 271 (1968); Simonton, Effect of Power in Life
Tenant to Make Absolute Disposition of Property-Governing Statute, 37 W. VA. L.Q. 422
(1931).
55. See, e.g., Wornom v. Hampton Normal & Agricultural Inst., 144 Va. 533,
132 S.E. 344 (1926); Davis v. Kendall, 130 Va. 175, 107 S.E. 751 (1921) (1885 will);
Taylor v. Johnson, 114 Va. 329, 76 S.E. 325 (1912); Randall v. Harrison's Ex'r, 109
Va. 686, 64 S.E. 992 (1909). Cf. Barnett v. Blain, 126 Va. 179, 101 S.E. 239 (1919)
(statute mentioned but not applied because testator died before its enactment);
Steffey v. King, 126 Va. 120, 101 S.E. 62 (1919) (same).
56. Gardner v. Worrell, 201 Va. 355, 357, 111 S.E.2d 285, 286 (1960). The
latest Virginia decision, Pigg v. Haley, 294 S.E.2d 851 (Va. 1982), may indicate
some relaxation of this requirement for application of the statute.
1983)
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valid remainder on an estate or interest for life even though the life tenant
has an unrestricted power of disposition of the fee simple in land or the
absolute ownership of chattels.57 Yet even in these jurisdictions, if there is
the slightest ambiguity or doubt as to whether the holder of the unrestricted
power of disposition took a fee simple (or an equivalent interest in chattels)
or a life estate or interest, there is a tendency to favor the fee simple con-
struction and hold the gift over void.5"
Method F will probably accomplish Howard Staunton's purpose.
Helen will get only a life estate with an unrestricted power of disposition
inter vivos and the museum will have a valid vested remainder. As Helen's
restricted interest will be of record, however, she will find it less easy to
make a sale, particularly of the land. A careful prospective purchaser may
refuse to accept a conveyance from her without a decree binding upon the
museum establishing her power to convey.
G. Express Testamentaty Trust With Third Party Trustee
The express trust is perhaps the most flexible and useful device avail-
able to lawyers. It may be used to accomplish a variety of purposes so wide
that its uses are almost unlimited.5 9 Howard Staunton's wishes can be ap-
proximated in some states by means of an express testamentary trust cre-
ated by a clause of his will providing, "I devise my home at 4 Carlisle
Crescent and bequeath the contents thereof, including my collection of
chess sets, to the Staunton National Bank, its successors and assigns, upon
trust for the following purposes: (1) to keep the trust property insured,
make necessary repairs, and pay special assessments and property and in-
come taxes; (2) to permit my beloved wife, Helen Anderson Staunton, to
occupy the home and keep possession of its contents so long as she lives;
(3) to sell and convey the real property and transfer the personal property
to such persons as my said wife shall direct; (4) to pay over the proceeds of
any property sold pursuant to my said wife's direction to her for her own
57. Luscomb v. Fintzelberg, 162 Cal. 433, 123 P. 247 (1912) (real and personal
property); Kent v. Morrison, 153 Mass. 137, 26 N.E. 427 (1891) (land); Rubey v.
Barnett, 12 Mo. 3 (1848) (land, slaves, money, and evidences of debt); Anon., 3
Leonard 71, 74 Eng. Rep. 548, 4 Leonard 41, 74 Eng. Rep. 716 (C.P. 1578) (free-
hold land); Reith v. Seymour, 4 Russ. 262, 38 Eng. Rep. 804 (M.R. 1828) (invest-
ment securities). Numerous other cases to this effect are collected in L. SIMES & A.
SMITH, supra note 7, § 1488; Annot., 76 A.L.R. 1153 (1932); Annot., 36 A.L.R. 1177
(1925). See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 111 (1936); A. KALES, Supra note
17, § 726.
58. See, e.g., Jackson ex dem. Livingston v. Robins, 16 Johns. 537, 588 (N.Y.
1819); Sterner v. Nelson, 210 Neb. 358, 314 N.W.2d 263 (1982); L. SIMES & A.
SMITH, supra note 7, § 1489. Numerous cases are collected in Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 7
(1951); Annot., 75 A.L.R. 71 (1931). See a/so J. GRAY, supra note 6, § 74e; Schnebly,
upra note 6, § 26.47, at 482.
59. See Fratcher, Fascicle on Trust in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COM-
PARATIVE LAw § 1 (1974).
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use absolutely; (5) to convey any trust property remaining at my said wife's
death to the Staunton Museum of Chess, a charitable corporation, its suc-
cessors and assigns. I bequeath the sum of $100,000 to the said trustee to be
invested and held upon trust to use the income and any principal needed to
meet the costs of administration of the foregoing trust and any expenses
arising from the carrying out of Purpose (1) thereof. Any surplus income
shall be paid to or at the direction of my said wife."
The Rule Against Restraints on Testate and Intestate Succession, dis-
cussed in connection with Methods A and B, and the Doctrine of Double
Thwart, discussed in connection with Method F, cannot be avoided by use
of an express testamentary trust. If the court finds that Helen took an equi-
table fee simple under the trust, the gift over to the museum is void in most
jurisdictions.' For example, in Hawley v. Watkins," a testator devised and
bequeathed a third of his estate upon trust for his mentally incompetent
sister, "the said money to be advanced to her as she may need it. Should
any of the said sum of money be in the hands of the said trustee at the death
of my said sister, . . . my desire is that the same be equally divided be-
tween" two named persons.6 2 It was held that the sister took an equitable
fee simple and that the gift over to the two persons was void for
63repugnancy.
Howard Staunton wishes Helen to have possession and control of the
house at 4 Carlisle Crescent and its contents. In some states, when the ben-
eficiary is entitled to possession of the trust property the trust is destroyed
and the beneficiary takes legal title.6 4 If Carlisle Crescent is located in a
state with legislation to this effect, there is no point to using language of
trust because the result will be the same as that in Method F. If your state
does permit trusts under which the beneficiary is entitled to possession of
the trust property, Helen will have the bank looking over her shoulder to
see that she does not damage or destroy the trust property. Howard may
not want Helen to be subject to such scrutiny. In any event, use of an
60. See, e.g., Storkan v. Ziska, 406 Ill. 259, 94 N.E.2d 185 (1950); Van Deventer
v. McMullen, 157 Tenn. 571, 11 S.W.2d 867 (1928); Culpeper Nat'l Bank v. Wrenn,
115 Va. 55, 78 S.E. 620 (1913); Hunter v. Hicks, 109 Va. 615, 64 S.E. 988 (1909)
(beneficiary of trust had power of sale; remainder held void); Davis v. Heppert, 96
Va. 775, 32 S.E. 467 (1899) (trust forA for life, trustee to convey as requested byA,
remainder to A's children); Meyer v. Barnett, 60 W. Va. 467, 56 S.E. 206 (1906)
(beneficiary had power of sale); Morgan v. Morgan, 60 W. Va. 327, 55 S.E. 389
(1906) (trustee to convey as directed by beneficiary).
61. 109 Va. 122, 63 S.E. 560 (1909).
62. Id. at 123, 63 S.E. at 560.
63. Id. at 124, 63 S.E. at 560.
64. See MICH STAT. ANN. § 26.53 (West 1974) (land only); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 501.03 (West 1947) (land only; id. § 501.04 makes § 501.03 inapplicable if trustee
has active duties); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.1 (McKinney 1967);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-03-05 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.4 (West 1971)
(land only); S.D. COmP. LAwS ANN. § 43-10-2 (1967).
1983]
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express trust with a third party trustee will be costly. The Staunton Na-
tional Bank cannot afford to serve without compensation and it must be
provided with funds to cover expenses. If the existence of the trust is a
matter of public record, as every express testamentary trust is, anyone with
actual or constructive notice of the existence of the trust is bound to inquire
into the trustee's powers before accepting a conveyance or other transfer
from it and is charged with knowledge of whatever such inquiry would have
produced.65 This being so, Helen will not be able to get the trust property
transferred as expeditiously or economically as she could if she appeared to
be the absolute owner, as she would under Methods D (secret trust) and E
(contract to make a will).
The chief advantage of using an express testamentary trust with a
bank as trustee is that the chances of the trust property being mingled or
confused with Helen's individual property at the time of her death are min-
imized. The bank will have an inventory of the trust property and will
transfer it promptly to the museum. From the standpoint of the Staunton
Museum of Chess, Method G may be the most satisfactory. Although the
requirement that Helen ask the bank to make any sale or gift that she
wishes may restrict her to some extent, it will protect against false claims
made after Helen's death that she made gifts of rare chess sets to the claim-
ants. You have decided tentatively that you will discuss Method G with
Howard Staunton and see whether he prefers it to Method E (contract to
make a will). As you will put the question, he must decide whether he
thinks the extra expense of Method G and the restrictions on Helen's free-
dom of action which it entails are worth accepting in order to get slightly
greater protection of the museum's right to get all of the property that
Helen does not sell or give away. You may tell him that Method G runs a
slightly greater risk of running afoul of the Rule Against Restraints on Tes-
tate and Intestate Succession or the Doctrine of Double Thwart, because his
real plan of disposition will be disclosed. If the contract to make a will
scheme is used and Helen does her part by executing a will devising what
she has left of the property passing to her under her husband's will to the
museum, there will be no disclosure unless her heirs and next of kin contest
the will. Even if they succeed in a will contest, they cannot reach the home
or its contents if the contract is valid.
65. 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 32, § 297; Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37
N.Y.U. L. REV. 627, 645-649 (1962). See also Fratcher, Powers and Duties of Guardians
of Property, 45 IOWA L. REv. 264, 307-10, 326-27 (1960). The duty of inquiry is
abolished by UNIF. TRUSTEES' POWERS AcT § 7 (1964), which has been enacted in
ten states. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 737.405 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 68-107
(1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-1207 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.830
(Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 7-406 (1981); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 91-9-115 (1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-A:7 (Supp. 1981); OR.
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H. Express Testamentag Trust With Life Beneficia7 as Trustee
If this method is chosen, Howard Staunton's will would provide, "I
devise my home at 4 Carlisle Crescent and bequeath the contents thereof,
including my collection of chess sets, to my beloved wife, Helen Anderson
Staunton, her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, upon trust for
the following purposes: (1) to keep the trust property insured, make neces-
sary repairs, and pay special assessments and property and income taxes;
(2) to permit my said wife to occupy the home and keep possession of its
contents so long as she lives; (3) to sell and convey the real property and
transfer the personal property to such persons as my said wife shall direct;
(4) to pay over the proceeds of any property sold pursuant to my said wife's
direction to her for her own use absolutely, free of trust; (5) to convey any
trust property remaining at my said wife's death to the Staunton Museum
of Chess, a charitable corporation, its successors and assigns."
The decisions are not in complete accord, but the prevailing and better
view seems to be that one can be trustee for himself for life and thereafter
for another without having the trust destroyed, wholly or partially, by
merger.66 In any event, the interest of the remainderman beneficiary is not
destroyed by merger.67 This plan, if it works, would probably involve less
cost for trustee's compensation than Method G (bank as trustee) and it
would relieve Helen of the irritation of having the bank looking over her
shoulder to see that she does not damage or destroy the trust property.
As in the case of Method G, the Rule Against Restraints on Testate
and Intestate Succession, discussed in connection with Methods A and B,
and the Doctrine of Double Thwart, discussed in connection with Method
F, cannot be avoided by use of an express testamentary trust. If Helen is
held to take an estate in fee simple in the house and an equivalent interest
in the chattels, the gift over to the museum is likely to fail. As in the case of
Method G, Helen's right to possession of the trust property will convert her
interest into a legal estate in some states.' The existence of the trust will be
a matter of public record, which may impede Helen's exercise of her powers
to convey the land and sell or give away the chattels. Unlike Method G, if
66. See Williams v. Nylund, 268 F.2d 91 (10th Cir. 1959); Woodbery v. Atlas
Realty Co., 148 Ga. 712, 98 S.E. 472 (1919); Morgan v. Murton, 131 N.J. Eq. 481,
26 A.2d 45 (1942); 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 32, § 99.3.
67. In re Estate of Duskis, 76 Misc. 2d 411, 351 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sur. Ct. 1973),
involved a will devising and bequeathing the entire estate to the husband of the
testatrix upon trust to pay the income to himself for life, with the right to invade
and to use any part or parts of the principal for his sole use and benefit and in his
sole discretion, without being accountable to anyone. The will provided that the
trust was to end on the husband's death and bequeathed the residue to two sisters or
their issue. It was held that the husband took a legal estate for life, with power to
invade principal, and what remained in his possession at his death would pass to the
remaindermen. Id. at 413-14, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 100-01.
68. See statutes cited note 64 supra.
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Helen is the trustee, there will be no bank trustee with an inventory of the
trust property, ready to step in when she dies to see that the trust property is
not confused with Helen's estate and that it is transferred promptly to the
museum. Neither will there be the protection against false claims of gifts
provided by Method G's requirement that the bank make transfers of the
trust property at Helen's direction during her lifetime. You conclude that,
on balance, if an express testamentary trust is to be used, it would be best to
have the bank act as trustee.
V. EPILOGUE
A week has passed since your conference with Howard Staunton about
his proposed new will. You suggested then that he return to your office at
2:00 p.m. today to discuss possible methods of carrying out his wishes.
While you were shaving this morning, you decided to recommend to How-
ard the use of either Method E (contract to make a will) or Method G
(express testamentary trust with the bank as trustee). He would be able to
help you to decide which of these two methods would come closest to carry-
ing out his wishes. Then you went to breakfast and opened the morning
newspaper beside your plate. In the middle of the front page you found a
news item which wrecked your plans. It read:
PROMINENT LOCAL BANKER DIES
Colonel Howard Staunton, 73, Chairman of the Board of Di-
rectors of the Staunton National Bank, was found dead in his
study by his wife, Helen, last evening. Dr. Warren Maddox,
County Medical Examiner, stated that death occurred at about
8:00 p.m. and was caused by a massive heart attack. Funeral ar-
rangements are incomplete. Colonel Staunton is survived by his
wife, the former Helen Anderson, and a son, John Staunton, Presi-
dent of the Staunton National Bank. Colonel Staunton was the
founder of the Staunton Museum of Chess and an internationally
known collector of chess sets. He was decorated with the Distin-
guished Service Cross for exceptional heroism in combat while
leading his battalion at Anzio, Italy, in 1944.
When you reached your office this morning you found Mrs. Howard
Staunton seated in the waiting room outside your door. After your condo-
lences, Helen said, "I am on my way to the funeral parlor but I decided to
stop here to ask you to get the legal processes rolling. There are three things
to be done. First, here is Howard's 1973 will, which names me as executrix.
Please get it admitted to probate. I want you to handle the estate. Second,
here is a warranty deed that Howard wrote out himself, signed, had wit-
nessed, acknowledged, and handed to me after he had a slight heart attack
two days after his appointment with you last week. It conveys the house at
4 Carlisle Crescent and all its contents to me absolutely and forever. Please
get it recorded. Third, please prepare a will for me. It should exercise my
power of appointment under the will of my first husband, Henry West, in
favor of my children by him, Henry West, Jr. and Rebecca West Farnham.
[Vol. 48
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It should exercise my power of appointment under the will of my second
husband, George Hancock, in favor of my children by him, Moffat Han-
cock and Jean Hancock Harbison. The house at 4 Carlisle Crescent and its
contents, including Howard's collection of chess sets, are to go to the
Staunton Museum of Chess. I want to give the residue of my estate to my
four children in equal shares. Call me if you need further information or
instructions."
As Helen Anderson Staunton left your office you mused, "Well, How-
ard, you seem to have solved your own problem without my help. I think
that yours is the best possible solution."
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